Radar control of airspace. A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external radiation sources, and a radar station for its implementation. For detecting air and space targets

A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective intelligence and control system airspace... An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of subdivisions and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of the Russian Federation today there are open sections of the state border and internal regions of the country. OJSC "NPP" Kant ", which is part of the state corporation" Russian Technologies ", is conducting research and development work on the creation of a prototype of a multi-position spaced-apart radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of systems cellular communication, radio broadcasting and television of ground and space-based ("Rubezh" complex).

Today, the manifold increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (SVN), and the stricter requirements of electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules do not allow in peacetime to "pollute" populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radar). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999, No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established, which are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars is many times higher than these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying, stealthy targets, which requires the consolidation of the combat formations of the radar of a traditional fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MVRLP). To create a continuous 24-hour MVRLP on duty with a height of 25 meters (the height of the flight of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of active use of electronic suppression (EW) by the enemy, the traditional standby locating means can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

Save the expensive resource of the radar, increase their capabilities in a peaceful and war time, as well as to increase the noise immunity of the MVRLP is possible by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

For detecting air and space targets

Research on the use of external radiation sources in semi-active radar systems is widely conducted abroad. Passive radar systems analyzing signals from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, HF radio communications, which are reflected from targets, have become one of the most popular and promising fields of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, as well as the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, Great Britain.

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Govorov Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense). However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago in the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving semi-active location problems turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibilities of using semi-active location systems with external illumination have appeared in Russia.

Developed by NPP Kant, the Rubezh multi-position semi-active radar system is designed to detect air and space targets in a field of external illumination.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communication) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on the emission of its own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multichannel receiving modules (PM) are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a complex of semi-active location. The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex allows ensuring the secrecy of these assets and using the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of the masking coefficient is at least 1.5-2 times higher than that of a radar with a traditional combined principle of construction.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established limit of resource consumption. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all sources of radiation during the peace period will be disabled or disabled.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized non-directional transmitters of latent noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

No analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the well-known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers of radio broadcasting and television. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from the targets of external illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic software that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create receiving modules compact, with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and without exerting any influence on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic characteristics of detection make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W or more is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1 m2 in the "clearance zone" with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of a false alarm of 10-4 ... The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of the computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, carried out by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A. L. Mints "and the participation of the staff of VA VKO named after G. K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the promising application of low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module is removed at a distance of 1.3- 2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, the Yak-52 target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network allows building a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

It is proposed to build the system in several detection lines at a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200-300 kilometers and in height up to 1500 meters. Each detection boundary represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between BSs. The detection area is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental decision is based on the fact that with transmissive target detection, its effective reflecting surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect inconspicuous targets made using the Stealth technology.

Building up the capabilities of VKO

From the line to the line of detection, the number and direction of passing targets is being specified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmic (calculated) determination of the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is transmitted via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Target identification is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by target images.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multifrequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
to provide air and ground control facilities for the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional means of radar (the lower border of the controlled radar field is less than 300 meters, created only around the control centers major airports... Above the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines, which do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce the costs of placement and commissioning in comparison with any similar systems;
to solve problems in the interests of almost all power departments of the Russian Federation: Ministry of Defense (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small aircraft of general purpose is 20 percent annually), the FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and the protection of the state border), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring of fire safety, search aircraft crashed, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Help "VPK"

For more than 28 years, the research and production enterprise "Kant" has been developing, producing and carrying out maintenance of modern means of special communication and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security complexes and information channels. The products of the enterprise are used to supply almost all power structures of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC "NPP" Kant "has a modern laboratory and production facilities, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering and technical specialists, which allows it to perform a full range of research and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

It is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of subdivisions and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of Russia today there are open sections of the state border and internal regions of the country.

OJSC NPP Kant, which is part of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, is conducting research and development work on the creation of a prototype of a multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, radio broadcasting and terrestrial and space-based television ( complex "Rubezh").

In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999, No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established, which are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars is many times higher than these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying, stealthy targets, which requires the consolidation of the combat formations of the radar of a traditional fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSSR).

To create a continuous 24-hour MVRLP on duty with a height of 25 meters (the height of the flight of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP will be at least 3 million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of the radar, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, as well as increase the noise immunity of the MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with an external source of illumination.

For detecting air and space targets

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after V.I. Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago in the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving semi-active location problems turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibilities of using semi-active location systems with external illumination have appeared in Russia.

Developed by JSC "NPP" Kant " complex of multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system "Rubezh" designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such a field of illumination is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex allows ensuring the secrecy of these means and using the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of the concealment coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than that of a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

In this regard, it would be a far-sighted decision to create specialized non-directional transmitters of latent noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules that remained from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues to the "Rubezh" complex

The "Rubezh" complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers of radio broadcasting and television. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from the targets of external illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a distance between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W or more is capable of ensuring the detection of low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m 2 in the "clearance zone" with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of a false alarm of 10 -4 ... The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of the computing facilities.

The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, carried out by OJSC NPP Kant with the assistance of OJSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of employees of the VA VKO them. G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target locating systems in the illumination field of BS of GSM cellular systems.

When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, the Yak-52 target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network allows building a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 km, along the front in a band of 200–300 km and in height up to 1500 meters.

Each detection boundary represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between BSs. The detection area is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental decision is based on the fact that with transmissive detection of a target, its effective reflecting surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect inconspicuous targets made using the "Stealth" technology.

Building up the capabilities of VKO

Information from each detection zone is transmitted via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. The identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by the image of targets.

In this way, complex "Rubezh" will allow:

1.create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multifrequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various sources of illumination;

2.To provide air and ground control facilities for the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar facilities (the lower border of the controlled radar field is less than 300 meters, created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);

3.significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning in comparison with any similar systems;

4.To solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation:

- MO (building up a duty low-altitude radar field in threatened directions);

- FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space);

- ATC (control over flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small aircraft for general aviation is 20% annually);

- FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of the state border);

- Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring of fire safety, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the Russian Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

/Andrey Demidyuk, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor;
Evgeniy Demidyuk, candidate of technical sciences, vpk-news.ru/

Radar fieldis called an area of \u200b\u200bspace with a given height of the lower boundary, within which the radar grouping provides reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility zone (detection) is the area of \u200b\u200bspace around the radar within which the station can detect and track aerial targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The border of the radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar visibility zones. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of an air enemy in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30 °. This leads to the presence of so-called "dead craters" in the radar visibility zone, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of \u200b\u200blocal items is difficult. Even if the radars are deployed in a position that meets the requirements for it, on medium-rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the equipment for protection against passive interference (the system for selecting a moving target) does not completely "remove" marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this zone is difficult. In addition, when the radar is operating with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.

The cross-section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conventionally taken as a ring centered at the radar station. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of this type at a given height. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the radar "dead funnel".

When creating a RLP group in the intelligence system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible removal of confident detection in the most probable direction of enemy air raids (in front of the leading edge).

A continuous radar field should cover the space over the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the air enemy.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a solid field should be at least 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance assets (number of radars).

It is necessary to dwell on the choice of the optimal value of the height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for fulfilling the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radar, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar needs to be located, the more the radar will be required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the less the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and development trends of EHV already now require the creation of a radar field in the altitude range of several tens of meters (50-60 m.).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower boundary, a huge amount of radar equipment will be required. Calculations show that with a decrease in the height of the lower boundary of the field from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and with a decrease from 500 m to 100 m - by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

At present, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) zone of action by ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the forward edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars that are in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values \u200b\u200bof the intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units by radar reconnaissance units in their single grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. All units are armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility zones;

Condition: Let it be required to create a continuous radar field with the height of the lower boundary "H min". The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar on "H min" is known and is equal to "D".

The task can be solved by the location of the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (staggered).

In this case, the RL field on "H min" will look like (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radar will be equal to:

In the first method, d \u003d D \u003d 1.41 D;

For the second d \u003d D \u003d 1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, it can be concluded that the creation of a radar field by positioning the radar at the vertices of equilateral triangles (staggered) is economically more profitable, since it requires fewer stations.

A grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle will be called a grouping of type "A".

While beneficial in terms of cost savings, the A-class does not provide other critical requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radar leads to the formation of large dips in the radar field. Losses of air targets during wiring will be observed even if all radars are in good working order, since the "Dead craters" in the radar visibility zones are not blocked.

A grouping of type "A" has an unsatisfactory field characteristic in front of the leading edge. In areas occupying a total of over 20% of the width of the front strip, the removal of the reconnaissance zone in front of the leading edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of the radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general it is possible to draw a conclusion that the type "A" grouping can be used only in exceptional cases with an acute shortage of funds and in secondary directions deep in the operational formation of the front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a radar grouping, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type "B". Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range "D" at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. The intervals between the radar in the lines d \u003d D, and the distance between the lines

C \u003d D \u003d 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by the B-type grouping, the space is simultaneously viewed by three radars, and in some areas even a family. Due to this, a high stability of the radar field and the reliability of the guidance of air targets are achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This constellation provides overlapping of radar “dead craters” and local object zones (which can be achieved only with d \u003d D), and also excludes possible failures in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field in time, each radar participating in the creation of the field must work around the clock. This is not practically feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars should be deployed, which form the radar.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the orb.

To create a continuous radar line, it is advisable to arrange the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the specified height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between the radar equal to the detection range of air targets "D" at the height "H min" of the lower boundary of the field in this area (d \u003d D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the "H min" field.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/2000 p. 30-33

Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: problems of improvement

Lieutenant General A.V. SHRAMCHENKO

Colonel V.P. SAUSHKIN, candidate of military sciences

An IMPORTANT component of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the safety of air traffic over the territory of the country is radar reconnaissance and airspace control. The key role in solving this problem belongs to the radar facilities and systems of the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Air Transport Service (FSVT).

At the present stage, when the issues of rational use of material and financial resources allocated for defense, conservation of weapons resources and military equipment, the main direction of the development of radar facilities and systems should be considered not the creation of new ones, but the organization of a more effective integrated use of existing ones. This circumstance predetermined the need to concentrate the efforts of various departments on the integration of radar facilities and systems into the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS) within the framework of the Federal Air Intelligence and Airspace Control System (FSR and KVP) of the Russian Federation.

Developed in accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia, the federal target program for improving the FSR and KVP for 2000-2010 proclaims its goal to achieve the required efficiency and quality of solving the problems of air defense, guarding the state border of the Russian Federation in airspace, radar support of aviation flights and air traffic management at the most important air routes based on the integrated use of radar facilities and systems of the services of the RF Armed Forces and FSVT in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, assets and resources.

The main task of the first stage of improving the FSR and KVP (2000-2005) is the creation of EARLS in the Central and North Caucasian air defense zones, in the Kaliningrad air defense region (Baltic Fleet), in certain areas of the North-Western and Eastern air defense zones on the basis of complex equipping of groups troops and positions of the FSVT with unified means of automation of interspecific use.

For this, it is foreseen, first of all, to develop concepts for the development of radar detection means for equipping EARLS and a unified system for displaying the underwater, surface and air situation in naval theaters. Particular attention will be paid to the systemic issues of building a real-time information exchange system for the FSR and KVP on the basis of existing and promising means.

During this period, it is necessary to master the serial production of radar equipment that have passed state tests, unified complexes of automation equipment (KSA) for interspecific use in stationary and mobile versions, to begin the systematic equipping of groups of troops with them in accordance with the strategy for creating an EARLS. In addition, it is necessary to determine the composition, organizational structure and armament of the mobile reserve of the FSR and KBIT of constant readiness, as well as a list of radio engineering units of the coastal surveillance service of the Navy for inclusion in the FSR and KVP, to develop proposals and plans for their phased rearmament. It is necessary to carry out measures to modernize radio electronic equipment, extend its resource and maintain the existing fleet in good condition, R&D aimed at creating priority promising samples of interspecific use, develop norms (standards and recommendations) for basic equipment options for units of the Ministry of Defense and positions of FS VT dual-use, in in accordance with which they were retrofitted.

The result of the work should be testing experimental sections of EARLS fragments, equipping them with unified information exchange complexes, and spreading the experience gained to other air defense zones and areas.

In the second stage (2006-2010) it is envisaged to complete the formation of the EARLS in the North-Western and Eastern air defense zones; creation of EARLS fragments in certain areas of the Ural and Siberian air defense zones; creation of a mobile reserve of FSR and KVP of constant readiness, its equipping with mobile radars and KSA of interspecific use; completion of R&D work on the development of priority promising models of radio electronic equipment for interspecific use and the beginning of the systematic equipping of them with FSR and KVP; completion of the construction of an information exchange system for the SDF and KVP as a whole; R&D on the development of unified modular radars and CSA for interspecific use; creation of scientific and technical groundwork for further development and improvement of the FSR and KVP.

It should be noted that the strict departmental subordination of the radar facilities of the RF Armed Forces and the FSWT, combined with a low level of automation of the control processes of forces and radar reconnaissance assets, makes it difficult to build the FSR and KVP according to a single concept and plan, and especially the adoption of optimal decisions on its use in the interests of all radar consumers. information. Thus, the indicators of the effectiveness of the use of FSR and KVP in solving functional tasks, the patterns and principles of control, the powers and boundaries of responsibility of command and control bodies for controlling forces and means of radar reconnaissance in peacetime, while on alert and in the process of combat use, have not been determined.

The difficulty of identifying the patterns and principles of management of the SDF and KVP is due to insufficient experience in its use. It is required to create an appropriate terminology with the choice of the most accurate definitions of the basic concepts related to radar. Nevertheless, certain views have been formed on the principles of managing complex organizational and technical systems, the organization and methods of work of management bodies, taking into account the prospects for the development and implementation of automated control systems. A wealth of experience has been accumulated in solving problems of control of radar facilities and systems in the types of the RF Armed Forces and FSVT.

In our opinion, the management of the FSR and the KVP should be a set of coordinated measures and actions of the management bodies of the FSR and the KVP to maintain the subordinate forces and assets in constant readiness for their use and command them in the performance of the assigned tasks. It should be carried out taking into account the requirements of all interested parties based on the automation of the collection, processing and distribution of information at all levels.

Studies have shown that, firstly, only centralized planning and managementforces and means FSRand KVPwill allow at a given level of efficiency to maximize the reserve of the technical resource of radio-electronic equipment, reduce the number of maintenance personnel, create a unified system of operation, repair and material and technical support, and significantly reduce operating costs; Secondly, organizational structure and management methodsshould be such that the capabilities of technical means are used to the maximum extent to achieve management objectives; thirdly, only complex automation of control processesand use of optimization modelsallow to achieve a significant increase in the efficiency of application FSRand KVPcompared with traditional planning and management heuristic methods.

The basic principles of management of the FSR and KVP,in our opinion, there should be centralization and one-man management. Indeed, the dynamism and transience of changes in the air and radio-electronic situation, especially in the conditions of warfare, significantly increased the role of the time factor and the need for sole decision-makingand firmly enforcing it. And this can be achieved only with strict centralization of rights in the hands of one person. The centralization of control will allow in a short time and in the best way to coordinate the actions of diverse forces and means FSRand KVP, effectively apply them, quickly focus efforts on the main directions, on the solution of the main tasks. At the same time, centralized control should be combined with the provision of subordinates with initiative in determining how to accomplish their assigned tasks.

The need for one-man management and centralization of management also follows from the very goals of creating FSRand KVP, which are the reduction in the total costs of the Ministry of Defense and FSVTto conduct R&Don the development of automation and radar equipment, on the maintenance and development of the position of radar equipment; a unified understanding of the air situation in control bodies of all levels; ensuring the electronic compatibility of radar and communication means RF Armed Forcesand FSVT in areas of joint deployment; reduction of the type and unification of radar facilities, KSA and communication facilities, creation of uniform standards for their interface.

Since the basis FSRand KVPconstitute radio-technical troops Air Force General Managementcreating and the use of FSR and KVP, it is advisable to assign to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force,who, as chairman of the Central Interdepartmental Commission FSRand KVPcan administer FSRand KVP.The tasks of the commission should include: development of development plans FSRand KVPand coordination of research and development in this area, taking into account the main directions of improving the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of types RF Armed Forcesand FSVT; pursuing a unified technical policy with the phased creation FSRand KVP,development of proposals and recommendations for the types of the RF Armed Forces and the FSVT on the directions of development of radar, automation and communication facilities, their standardization and compatibility; development of programs and plans for equipping the FSR and KVP with technical means that provide a high-quality solution to peacetime and wartime problems, organization of certification, certification and licensing of technical means; coordination with the services of the Armed Forces and the FSVT of the developed normative and legal documents governing the procedure for the functioning of the FSR and KVP; coordinated planning and formation of orders for serial production, the purchase of new equipment for FSR and KVP and its deployment; planning and organizing the use of FSR and KVP in the interests of all interested consumers of radar information; coordination with the types of the RF Armed Forces and the FSVT on issues related to the deployment and redeployment of radar units.

The Air Force Commander-in-Chief can exercise direct control over the creation and improvement of the FSR and KVP through the Directorate of the Air Force Radio-Technical Troops, which performs the functions of the apparatus of the Central Interdepartmental Commission.

General management of the use of FSR and KVPin air defense zones, it is advisable to impose on the commanders of the air force formations,in air defense areas - on the commanders of air defense formations,who can control the FSR and the KVP personally, through the zonal interagency commissions of the FSR and the KVP, the headquarters of the air force and air defense formations, as well as through their deputies and chiefs of radio technical troops.

The tasks of the zonal interdepartmental commission of the FSR and the KVP, the headquarters of the air force formation (air defense formations) should include: planning and organizing combat duty of a part of the forces and means of the FSR and the KVP in the air defense zone (area); coordination of plans for the use of FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area) with all concerned departments; organizing and conducting training of personnel and equipment of the FSR and KVP to perform the assigned tasks; organization of radar reconnaissance and airspace control of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area); quality control and stability of the provision of radar information to control bodies; organization of interaction with forces and means of reconnaissance and airspace control that are not part of the FSR and KVP; coordination of issues of operation of technical means of FSR and KVP.

Structurally, the FSR and KVP control system should include control bodies, command posts, a communication system, automation equipment complexes, etc. Its basis, in our opinion, can be a control system of the Air Force radio-technical troops.

Direct controlforces and means of radar reconnaissance and airspace control should be carried out from the existing command posts of the branches of the Armed Forces and the FSVT (according to departmental affiliation). At the same time, they must organize their work and the work of subordinate forces and means in accordance with the requirements of consumers of radar information on the basis of a unified planning for the use of FSR and KVP in zones and regions Air defense.

In the course of combat use, radio engineering units (radar positions) of the FSR and KVP on issues of conducting radar reconnaissance and issuing radar information should be operatively subordinate to the command and control bodies of the Air Force radio engineering forces through command posts of the corresponding branches of the Armed Forces.

In the conditions of the ever-increasing dynamism of the air and radio-electronic situation and the active influence of the opposing side on radar facilities and systems, the requirements for ensuring their effective control increase sharply. It is possible to radically solve the problem of increasing the efficiency of the use of FSR and KVP only through complex automation of management processes based on implementationnew information technologies.A clear formulation of the goals of the functioning of the SDF and KVP, management tasks, the definition of target functions, the development of models that are adequate to the control objects - these are the main problems that need to be solved when synthesizing the structure of the control system and algorithms for its functioning, the distribution of functions across the levels of the control system and determining their optimal composition.

Military thought. 1999. No. 6. S. 20-21.

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He reported to the president that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012, had already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance in the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the skies above it.

In Russia, the solution of this task is entrusted to the radar station of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficient, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control were increasingly complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and a low level of equipment. civil aviation defendants of the unified system of state radar identification.

Control over flights in the "lower" airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megalopolises and especially in the Moscow zone, has become much more complicated. At the same time, the activity of terrorist organizations, capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft, has intensified.

The airspace control system is also influenced by the emergence of qualitatively new surveillance equipment: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information from the observed aircraft, parameters are transmitted to the controller directly from the aircraft navigation devices, and etc.

In order to streamline all the available means of observation, in 1994 it was decided to create a joint system of radar equipment of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that initiated the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was about a dual-use interagency system. The purpose of creating the FSR and the KVP was announced to combine the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in the airspace of Russia.

As work was carried out to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles of the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Federal Air Transport Agency).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out under the State Arms Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The main contractor for the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the minimum allowable level, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERS).

Until 2015, the area of \u200b\u200bthe airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces grew steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (URS). Such a reconnaissance and airspace control system was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

On the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program, which had been started, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of reconnaissance control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2016 and Beyond, approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, envisages a full-scale deployment of a single federal system by the end of last year.

However, the action of the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015) ”with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were supposed to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP ended its operation, but the new one was never approved.

Previously, the coordination of the relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of Airspace, established by a presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary regulatory framework.

Moreover, in 2015 in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control the post of general designer was removed. The coordination of the FSR and KVP bodies at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent specialists now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with a reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack.

The new dual-use system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the strengthening of threats from the air and outer space in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new type of armed forces - the Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of the strike of aerospace attack weapons - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This without fail requires new funding for the SDF and KVP under the appropriate federal target program or in another form, the re-creation of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period the tasks of warning of an air attack and information support of combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become priorities.

- Military columnist for Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy (1998).
Observer "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

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